Japan Defends the International Criminal Court as Washington Escalates Pressure

What Tokyo said on July 14

Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi said on July 14 that Japan was aware of Secretary of State Marco Rubio's announcement. Japan, he said, values the eradication and prevention of grave crimes and the rule of law, and has consistently supported the permanent international criminal tribunal. Tokyo was watching the U.S. announcement with concern and would respond while communicating with the court, Washington and other member states.

Chief Cabinet Secretary Minoru Kihara separately affirmed the same support. Reported U.S. options include diplomatic pressure encouraging members to withdraw, travel bans and visa revocations, increased sanctions against the court and connected organizations, and closer scrutiny of countries that receive U.S. assistance while refusing to reject ICC authority. Not all those additional measures have been enacted; the July 13 announcement set out a direction for a wider campaign.

What kind of court is the ICC?

The Rome Statute was adopted in 1998, and the ICC began work in July 2002 as the first permanent international criminal court. It prosecutes individuals, not countries, for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression—the gravest offenses of concern to the international community. Based in The Hague, it is not a United Nations organ, though it cooperates with the UN.

An arrest warrant is not a conviction. Judges assess a statutory threshold such as reasonable grounds to believe the person committed a crime and whether arrest is necessary. At trial, the prosecution must prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt; defendants have rights to counsel, disclosure, challenge evidence and appeal.

Where jurisdiction comes from

There are four basic doors. Conduct may occur on the territory of a State Party; the suspect may be a national of a State Party; a non-member may accept jurisdiction over a specified situation; or the UN Security Council may refer one. A prosecutor-led investigation can also require authorization from a Pre-Trial Chamber. Jurisdiction over aggression has narrower, more complex rules.

Washington's core objection is that a treaty the United States and Israel did not ratify cannot legitimately prosecute their nationals without consent. The court's legal position is that states may delegate their ordinary territorial criminal jurisdiction to a treaty court, so a foreign national acting on member-state territory can fall within it. Afghanistan was a State Party during the relevant period, putting alleged U.S. conduct there within the territorial argument. In the Palestine situation, judges upheld territorial jurisdiction and issued warrants in November 2024 for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former defense minister Yoav Gallant. Washington calls that an illegitimate overreach.

Complementarity: a court of last resort

The ICC is not a global supreme court automatically sitting above national judges. Under Article 17's complementarity principle, a case is generally inadmissible when a state with jurisdiction is genuinely investigating or prosecuting the same person and conduct. The ICC steps in where there is no genuine process, a proceeding is designed to shield responsibility, independence or impartiality is absent, or a collapsed system cannot act.

That means neither “a democracy is permanently exempt” nor “the ICC can freely override domestic courts” is accurate. The inquiry is specific: is a genuine national case addressing substantially the same conduct? Complementarity is the bridge between sovereignty and preventing impunity, but disputes over whether national proceedings are genuine inevitably generate political conflict.

How sanctions can disable a courtroom

Executive Order 14203, issued in February 2025, called ICC efforts against protected U.S. persons or nationals of non-consenting allies an unusual and extraordinary threat to U.S. national security and foreign policy. It permits blocking a designated person's U.S.-linked property, bars U.S. persons from providing funds, goods or services, and can suspend entry by officials and some family members.

The effect travels beyond U.S. borders. Dollar clearing, American banks, cloud hosting, email, cybersecurity, travel booking, insurance and legal or investigative services are embedded in global operations. Businesses fearful of liability often “over-comply,” cutting off more activity than the law strictly requires. That can impede judges receiving pay, prosecutors storing evidence securely, and lawyers or experts working with the court.

Harvard Law School reported that at least 11 judges, prosecutors and other officials had been sanctioned by March 2026. In U.S. litigation, international-law scholars obtained injunctions against applying the regime to their protected speech and professional work. Those plaintiff-specific victories did not erase the sanctions system. Expanding it to the institution or cooperating organizations would magnify the operational shock.

From Nuremberg and Tokyo to Rome

The Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II embedded the idea that state orders do not automatically erase individual responsibility for the gravest crimes. They also left hard criticisms: victors judging the defeated, retroactivity and uneven procedure. During the Cold War, plans for a permanent court stalled.

Atrocities in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda led the Security Council to create temporary tribunals in the 1990s. To avoid building a new court after each catastrophe, 160 countries negotiated the Rome Statute, adopted on July 17, 1998 by 120 votes to seven, with 21 abstentions. It entered into force on July 1, 2002 after the 60th ratification.

The result is still not universal. The United States, Russia, China, Israel and India are among important non-parties, and the court relies on national arrests. Criticism that early cases focused disproportionately on Africa, along with slow proceedings, collapsed cases and limited resources, damaged trust. Defending the institution should not mean romanticizing it: independence, even-handed selection, geographic balance, speed and internal governance all require reform. Reform and coercing judges are different projects.

America's policy has swung like a pendulum

President Bill Clinton's administration signed the Rome Statute at the end of 2000 but did not recommend ratification. In 2002, the George W. Bush administration notified the UN that the United States did not intend to become bound. The American Servicemembers' Protection Act that year entrenched protection for military and government personnel and accompanied bilateral agreements limiting surrender of Americans.

Yet the United States did not reject all international criminal justice. It allowed Security Council referrals involving Darfur and Libya and expanded practical engagement under President Barack Obama. The first Trump administration imposed visa limits in 2019 and asset sanctions in 2020 on Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda and a senior colleague over the Afghanistan inquiry. President Joe Biden revoked those sanctions in 2021—an action Japan publicly welcomed—and the U.S. later assisted accountability efforts related to Russia's invasion of Ukraine while remaining outside the court.

The second Trump administration restored and enlarged sanctions in February 2025, citing warrants for Israeli leaders and potential jurisdiction over Americans. July 2026 marks a new phase because pressure is moving from named individuals toward member states and the court's wider support network.

Why Japan is not a bystander

Japan became a State Party in October 2007. It supplied about 15% of assessed contributions in 2024, making it the largest contributor, and has continuously placed Japanese judges on the bench: Fumiko Saiga, Kuniko Ozaki and Tomoko Akane. Akane became a judge in 2018 and President of the Court in March 2024.

In March 2022, Japan joined the referral of the Ukraine situation to the prosecutor, at the time the only Asian country to do so. It has supported the Trust Fund for Victims, including earmarked help for survivors of sexual violence. In January 2026, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi met Akane and affirmed cooperation to uphold the rule of law. Tokyo's July position is therefore not a sudden anti-American turn; it extends nearly two decades of treaty, financial and human investment.

Japan's double test: Ukraine and Gaza

The rule of law is persuasive only when it does not change with the target. Japan strongly supports accountability for Russia's aggression and crimes in Ukraine. If it weakens the same institution when it acts against leaders of Israel, because Washington objects, Tokyo risks a rule for adversaries and immunity for friends.

Conversely, legal criticism of individual ICC decisions is compatible with institutional support. Jurisdiction, complementarity, evidence, procedure and fairness belong in motions and appeals. Sanctions aimed at judges' bank access or family travel are categorically different from a legal challenge: they make the adjudication itself harder.

Can alliance and treaty obligations coexist?

The U.S.–Japan alliance is the center of Japanese security policy, and Tokyo has reason to avoid a rupture with Washington. The Rome Statute is also a treaty Japan ratified through its constitutional process. Respecting the U.S. choice not to join is not the same as surrendering Japan's own choice to remain. Washington may ask allies for security cooperation; Tokyo may ask Washington to respect its legal obligations as a member.

“Watching with concern” and continued communication preserve a diplomatic bridge. But if pressure reaches Japanese banks, technology firms or court officials, general language will be insufficient. Japan will need rules identifying required Rome Statute cooperation, protecting lawful activity when foreign sanctions conflict with Japanese obligations, and ensuring designated judges can travel and work.

Seven actions available to Tokyo

What is really being defended

The ICC is imperfect. It lacks police, cannot arrest powerful suspects without states, and cannot escape Security Council politics. Its selection of cases, pace, cost and prosecutorial governance deserve exacting review. Correcting weaknesses, however, is not equivalent to intimidating the bench through sanctions.

Japan is not defending a court designed to oppose the United States. It is defending a place where allegations of genocide and war crimes are tested through published law and evidence rather than the suspect's nationality or alliance. The rule of law is tested precisely when a friend finds it inconvenient. Whether Tokyo turns its July 14 words into operational protection will define Japan's international role more deeply than the size of its contribution.